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Article 
Toxic Sovereignty 




University of Sunderland 
Abstract As a result of  the pressures exerted by neoliberal economics and consumer 
capitalism, late-capitalist subjects are forced to compete in increasingly brutal 
circumstances in order to avoid the fate of  symbolic and material annihilation. 
Economic and consumer engagement are not, however, solely based on coercion but are 
simultaneously facilitated by seductive ideals such as sovereignty. Conversations with 
those convicted for their involvement in investment fraud indicate the centrality of  the 
notion of  sovereignty to their subjective experience and, in turn, their motivation for 
fraud. The notion of  economic sovereignty was key to their understanding of  economic 
enterprise whereby they carved out spaces of  extreme personal freedom in which they 
were free to engage in acts of  serious and sustained economic predation. Similarly, 
perspectives on consumer sovereignty were characterised by a degree of  excess whereby 
the individual who self-governs consumptive choices was replaced by the individual who 
is characterised by the absolute right to pursue pleasure in an unrestrained way. As a 
consequence, many personal barriers against harm and criminality were eroded. Thus, 
whilst acts of  economic predation were driven by the deep-seated cultures of  anxiety 
and insecurity produced within contemporary capitalism, they were also facilitated by 
the cultural profusion of  notions of  sovereignty in this context which ultimately served 
as a means of  obfuscating the reality of  the individual’s relationship with capital.  
Keywords fraud, acquisitive crime, neoliberalism, consumer capitalism, criminal 
sovereignty, special liberty, harm  
‘By continually taking and piling and computing interest and leaving to one’s heirs, man 
contrives the illusion that he is in complete control of  his destiny. After all, accumulated 
things are a visible testimonial to power, to the fact that one is not limited or dependent. 
Man imagines the causa sui project is firmly in his hands, that he is the heroic maker and 
doer who takes what he creates, what is rightfully his. And so we have seen how modern 
man, in his one-dimensional economics, is driven by the lie of  his life, by his denial of  
limitation, of  the true state of  natural affairs’ (Becker 1975, 88). 
Depending on whether emphasis is placed on the social, cultural, economic, 
philosophical or political features of  late-capitalism, our current epoch might be defined 
in myriad ways. While these ostensibly unrelated developments appear to have altered 
late-capitalist society in wide-ranging ways, both Badiou (2008) and Harvey (2007; 2008) 
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demonstrate the way in which the various elements of  the late-capitalist landscape are 
all underpinned by a shared vision of  the ‘restoration of  class power’ (Harvey 2007, 31), 
each playing a role in its realisation. Thus, the wholesale transformation of  the social, 
cultural and economic landscape has served to remove barriers to accumulation existing 
both within the individual and society, allowing for the establishment of  the ‘Second 
Restoration’ (Badiou 2008, 26). Whilst the conditions present in late-capitalism aim to 
facilitate the acceleration of  elite acquisition, the requisite alterations to an individual’s 
subjectivity and environment are not restricted to this group. Consequently, these 
changes have spilled out across the whole of  late-capitalist society creating a vast array 
of  harmful subjectivities and behaviours which are underpinned by the quest for 
acquisition.  
Numerous features of  the late-capitalist landscape might be implicated in this process, 
but the current work remains focused on two in particular, namely the introduction of  
neoliberal economics and consumer capitalism and, more specifically, the importance accorded 
to the idea of  sovereignty in these realms. The article will consider the harmful 
implications of  contemporary capitalism’s emphasis on individualised sovereignty and 
will suggest that, when combined with environments characterised by extreme economic 
and symbolic insecurity, barriers to harm within the individual can be eroded, paving 
the way for the proliferation of  criminal and destructive behaviours. However, whilst 
these acts are sustained at the level of  subjective experience by the fantasy of  
sovereignty, they are underpinned by its antithesis: the subject’s fear of  limitation. The 
avoidance of  this reality forces the individual into the unrelenting pursuit of  profit and 
distinction and thus, in reality, represents the severe curtailment of  individual freedom 
by the psychic demands of  the capitalist system. The article is based on a research 
project which sought to explore the motivations of  those involved in acts of  economic 
predation. The data was collected over a period of  around eighteen months using in-
depth qualitative interviews with fourteen men, all of  whom had been convicted for 
their involvement in the perpetration of  fraudulent high-yield investment (Ponzi) 
schemes.   1
Neoliberalism and the Revival of Individual Sovereignty 
The introduction of  neoliberal economics was the outcome of  the work of  a small 
group of  historians, economists and philosophers working in the Mont Pelerin Society, 
who sought to revive doctrines of  classical economics and philosophical liberalism as the 
basis for the transformation of  the economic landscape of  the West (Harvey 2007). 
Within both of  these early intellectual movements, the sovereign individual is placed at 
the heart of  economic and philosophical considerations, with political change effected 
towards the promotion of  their rights and responsibilities. From the perspective of  
classical liberal philosophers, the individual is considered to be a sovereign entity whose 
freedoms must be protected from excessive regulation or arbitrary interference, 
particularly those emanating from ‘the king of  the vultures’(Mill 1964, 66), the state. 
 The term Ponzi scheme refers to a form of investment fraud whereby investors are offered 1
high rates of return on financial deposits. Investors’ money is then used to fund the interest 
payments to earlier investors. Such schemes are therefore dependent on attracting new 
investors in order to avoid collapse. The term ‘Ponzi’ derives from the name of Charles Ponzi 
who was arrested for his perpetration of this form of fraud in 1920 in the USA.
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The individual, therefore, must be granted maximum personal freedom and autonomy 
to determine their own fate and the only possible basis for interference with this liberty is 
in the event that freedom might be used to harm the interests of  another (Mill 1964, 
73-75). The definition of  harm employed in this perspective, however, remains 
extremely narrow, with the responsibility for the avoidance of  harm often falling to the 
individual who is expected to employ the maxim of  caveat emptor in his or her conduct 
(Mill 1964). This means that, in practice, the harmful outcomes of  behaviour are often 
rendered secondary considerations to the primacy of  ideals such as sovereignty and 
competition. Mill recognises, for example, the way in which the interests of  the 
individual may be harmed in competitive struggles, but suggests that the ‘general 
interest of  mankind’ (Mill 1964, 150) is better served by the protection of  competition 
than of  individual well-being in these circumstances. So strong is the emphasis placed on 
the individual’s right to self-determination that debates around self-governance appear 
to exceed notions of  rights, crossing over instead into the realm of  responsibility. Thus, 
Mill questions the ‘worth as a human being’ (Mill 2006, 59) of  those who rely on the 
guidance of  others. According to Mill: ‘He who lets the world, or his portion of  it, 
choose his plan of  life for him, has no need of  any other faculty than the ape-like one of  
imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties’ (Mill 2006, 59).  
The work of  de Sade (1990) reminds us that the exaltation of  individual sovereignty and 
individual subjective judgement on the one hand, and rejection of  external forms of  
control and collective notions of  the good on the other, may just as easily lead humanity 
into the territory of  evil and harm through the creation of  solipsistic sybarites, as it 
might effect positive social change. Within philosophical liberalism the potentially 
harmful effects of  individual autonomy are not without recognition. Mill, for example, 
concedes that ‘energy may be turned to bad uses’, but suggests that ‘more good may 
always be made of  an energetic nature, than of  an indolent and passive one’ (Mill 2006, 
60). Consequently, he calls for the cultivation of  ‘character’ which provides the impetus 
for both ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and which represents the ‘stuff  of  which heroes are 
made’ (Mill 2006, 60). Furthermore, Mill celebrates ‘pronounced individuality’, ‘non-
conformity’, ‘eccentricity’ (Mill 2006, 67) and ‘intelligent deviation’ (Mill 2006, 60) on 
account of  their ability to drive both individual and societal progress. That the assertion 
of  sovereignty might lead to deviance, therefore, comes to be celebrated on account of  
its ability to drive development. Moreover, he accepts as collateral the ability of  these 
same processes to produce harmful and criminal behaviours, suggesting that this 
represents a lesser evil than the curtailment of  individual freedoms.  
Indeed, this tendency to downplay the harmful effects of  individual evils in comparison 
with those of  the state continues to be a technique used repeatedly to champion the 
cause of  individual sovereignty from the neoliberal perspective. ‘Criminals,’ writes 
Rand, ‘are a minority in any age or country’ but, she continues, ‘[p]otentially, a 
government is the most dangerous threat to man’s rights’ (Rand 1964, 115). The 
minimisation of  the eventuality of  individual evil is also often achieved by stressing that 
humans naturally seek to please others. Rather than being underpinned by 
compassionate or altruistic motivations, Smith (1759) suggests that this desire to please is 
driven by self-love and self-interest (Eagleton 2009). This conversion of  self-interest into 
co-operation allows humanity to reduce the likelihood of  harmful behaviours by 
restricting the range of  actions available to the individual who seeks the approval of  
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others. When operating in competitive capitalist markets, however, Smith (1759, Part 2, 
Section 3, Chapter 3) highlights the tension that exists between this impulse and the 
drive for economic success. Not only do the two often conflict, insofar as economic 
success might necessitate immoral behaviour, but Smith (ibid) suggests that an individual 
may be precluded from receiving the approbation of  others should he fail to achieve 
success, even when characterised by impeccable conduct. Consequently, he recognises 
the need for a degree of  moral regulation in competitive economies in order to prevent 
the descent into unbridled competition and socially corrosive behaviours exacted within 
the pursuit of  profit.  
The atomised, sovereign individual is taken as the unit of  productivity in classical 
economics and is given political rights and responsibilities which aim at the 
maximisation of  his or her role in the production of  wealth. Crucially, the negative 
liberty afforded to the sovereign individual in liberalism provides the space in which 
economic development can occur, but these conditions also serve to stimulate activity by 
withdrawing sources of  support, giving responsibility to the individual for their 
performance within a wider competitive environment. By dismantling the forms of  
social and political regulation of  the economic realm constructed during the social 
democratic era, neoliberals sought a return to this model of  deregulated and 
individualised competition. Like their predecessors, neoliberals ‘emphasised freedom as 
the ultimate goal and the individual as the ultimate entity in society’ (Friedman 2002, 5). 
Economic progress was to be driven by the efforts of  individual ‘wealth creators’ (Rand 
2007) whose ‘individual genius’ (Friedman 2002, 4) must be given space to develop 
through the implementation of  deregulatory, negative liberty. The individual operating 
in the space carved out by deregulation is imbued with sovereignty which allows them to 
determine their own conduct. Neoliberal sovereignty, however, represents a purer form 
of  self-determination when compared with that of  classical liberalism, primarily as a 
result of  the extent to which individualism and economic logic have come to permeate 
all aspects of  life (Davies 2017). 
Disregarding Smith’s (1759) warnings about the potential dangers of  excessive 
deregulation and individual empowerment in the context of  competitive capitalism, 
many changes taking place across late-capitalism have served to remove both direct and 
indirect forms of  regulation which have traditionally influenced individualised conduct 
decisions. Exceeding formal processes of  economic deregulation, wholesale social and 
cultural change has taken place in order to remove many of  the barriers to 
accumulation existing within the individual and their social environment. As part of  this 
process, informal sources of  social control such as the family, the community and the 
church have been systematically dismantled, discredited and infiltrated by economic 
logic, undermining their ability to counter dominant competitive economic messages 
and to exert influence over an individual’s behaviour (Currie 1997; Messner & Rosenfeld 
2006). Consequently, contemporary capitalism has been able to ‘redefin[e] social and 
ethical life in accordance with economic criteria and expectations’ (Dean 2009, 51). The 
result, Currie suggests is: 
‘the spread of  a civilization in which the pursuit of  personal economic gain 
becomes increasingly the dominant organizing principle of  social life; a 
social formation in which market principles, instead of  being confined to 
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some parts of  the economy, and appropriately buffered and restrained by 
other social institutions and norms, come to suffuse the whole social fabric 
and to undercut and overwhelm other principles that have historically 
sustained individuals, families and communities’ (Currie 1997, 151-152). 
  
Alongside these changes to the nature of  late-capitalist institutions, the development of  
post-modern thought has significantly contributed to the deregulation of  the subject and 
the expansion of  the notion of  sovereignty. Through its attack on universal truth and 
collective identity and understandings, and its promotion of  individual or minority 
identities and perspectives, postmodernism has dismantled the individual’s relationship 
with the Symbolic Order. The result is that we are encouraged ‘not only to accept, but 
even to revel in the fragmentation and the cacophony of  voices through which the 
dilemmas of  the modern world are understood’ (Harvey 2008, 116). With regard to the 
ethics of  decision making, late-capitalist subjects come to be characterised by an 
individualising logic which leads them towards solipsism. When combined with the 
extreme individualism of  liberalism, Raymen (forthcoming) suggests that late-capitalist 
subjects come to be characterised by ‘ethical paralysis’ whereby they are unable to 
engage with the conceptual apparatus required for making ethical decisions. 
Consequently, we have taken steps towards Kant’s, and by logical extension, de Sade’s 
(1990) interpretation of  self-determination whereby we are called upon ‘to use one’s own 
understanding without the guidance of  another’ (Kant 1991, 54). Thus, we have come 
to reject the notion of  any moral authority which is external to the self  and whose 
judgement might be superior to our own individualised perspective. In determining 
what is right and desirable, we are left only with the subjective judgements of  the 
sovereign individual of  liberalism (Raymen forthcoming). That hyper-individualist, 
ethical solipsism might lead us into undesirable, and potentially harmful territory is 
inevitable given the range of  human proclivities, tastes and interests. However, Eagleton 
suggests that those who exist in conditions which ‘force their backs to the wall [and], 
confront them... in some room full of  light with what terrifies them the most in the 
world’ are ‘generally incapable of  being at their finest’ (Eagleton 2010, 153). Particular 
aspects of  both the neoliberal economic model and consumer culture serve to replicate 
this function within everyday existence by subjecting individuals to extreme pressure in 
the material and symbolic realm. 
Chronic Insecurity: The Forced Choices of Free Individuals 
From the neoliberal perspective, the highly competitive framework into which the 
atomised individual is embedded is understood to be ‘a better way of  guiding individual 
efforts than any other’ (Hayek 1976, 27) on account of  its role in providing stimulus 
towards economic productivity. The competitive efforts of  individual economic actors 
are seen, therefore, cumulatively to drive wider social and economic progress. 
Individuals are further ‘incentivised’ towards economic productivity by the grave 
consequences of  failure following the state’s retreat from its role in offering individuals 
protection against the excesses of  market forces. The state’s role, thus, moves from the 
provision of  economic rights, to that of  political rights which facilitate economic 
engagement, but do not provide economic support for those in need: 
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‘The right to life means that a man has the right to support his life by his 
own work (on any economic level, as high as his ability will carry him); it 
does not mean that others must provide him with the necessities of  life. The 
right to property means that a man has the right to take the economic 
actions necessary to earn property, to use it and to dispose of  it; it does not 
mean that others must provide him with property’ (Rand 1964, 114).  
Increasingly, those who do not succeed on the unpredictable terrain of  capitalism, face 
the prospect of  abject poverty. The economic logic of  the neoliberal model thus draws 
heavily on the ideas of  philosophical liberalism whereby the individual who has a 
responsibility to determine his or her own existence according to the implementation of  
personal judgement, becomes the economic actor who is responsible for their own 
economic survival. Within this context, the ‘individual must become a self-entrepreneur, 
responsible for his or her own existence and integration into the market’ (Amable 2011, 
15). Consequently, appraisal of  one’s economic position becomes deracinated from any 
wider socio-economic context, with both success and failure coming to be interpreted as 
a reflection of  an individual’s characteristics, effort and performance. In addition to the 
invigorating effects of  individualised competition, its ability to construct a visible 
hierarchy of  individuals according to their merits and efforts is espoused as one of  the 
greatest achievements of  the neo-liberal model. Consequently, both material and 
symbolic survival is at stake in the neoliberal struggle for enrichment, as economic 
position comes to operate as a signifier of  an individual’s value meaning that economic 
failure becomes a fate to be avoided at all costs. The outcome, Currie suggests, is the 
creation of  ‘sink or swim societies’ (Currie 1997, 152) centred on the principles of  
‘struggle and competition’ of  social Darwinism (Amable 2011, 8). Moreover, Eagleton 
highlights that our existence in these ‘desperately deformed conditions’ (Eagleton 2010, 
153) stimulates our propensity to evil. As a result of  the ‘incessant struggle for 
resources’ (Eagleton 2010, 154), late-capitalist subjects become more willing to adopt 
ruthless measures aimed at their preservation in the vicissitudes of  capitalist markets. 
Competitive efforts aimed at sustaining symbolic survival within late-capitalism are 
dependent not only on the pursuit of  financial wealth but also on the conspicuous 
consumption (Veblen 2005) of  positional goods (Hirsch 1978). The individual consumer 
is expected to symbolise their success, and by extension superiority, by visibly marking 
themselves off  from those who have failed, through his consumption of  exclusive goods 
and experiences. Rather than representing an opportunity for enjoyment, this process 
also comes to exert intense pressure on the individual consumer causing them to be 
characterised by extremely high levels of  anxiety. That this anxiety is fuelled by the 
objectless desire which underpins the individual’s relationship with consumption, and 
which precludes any form of  lasting satisfaction, is well documented (Bocock 1993; Hall, 
Winlow & Ancrum 2008; McGowan 2016). The intense pressure to consume has also 
extended further into the lives of  late-capitalist subjects through the cultural injunction 
to enjoy. Through the operation of  this injunction, the responsibilised individual of  
liberalism is replicated in the cultural realm whereby they are called upon to maximise 
their own pursuit of  pleasure and enjoyment (Žižek 2008; 2009). Citizens of  consumer 
capitalism are thus imbued with sovereignty which they are expected to implement in 
the identification and exploitation of  chances for enjoyment and in the pursuit of  their 
personalised imaginary ideals (Dean 2009). Again, this process of  liberation is 
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underpinned by one of  responsibilisation which exerts pressure on the individual as they 
come to experience feelings of  guilt should they fail to exploit such opportunities (Hall, 
Winlow & Ancrum 2008, 189). As the engagement with pleasure in consumer capitalism 
comes to be characterised by compulsion, enjoyment can move beyond the pleasure 
principle, moving instead into the realm of  anxiety and discomfort (Dean 2009). Rather 
than triggering a withdrawal from the pursuit of  pleasure, continued engagement is 
sustained by the role of  fantasy which attributes the failure to enjoy to an external factor, 
rather than to an intrinsic and unavoidable feature of  the process itself  (ibid). Thus, the 
pursuit of  the lost object which is inscribed at the heart of  the capitalist system is 
perpetuated by capitalism’s ability to alienate its subjects from the experience of  
satisfaction which ensures their eternal engagement with the ‘illusory promise’ of  
commodities (McGowan 2016, 36).  
However, whilst the anxiety that drives economic engagement may well be stimulated by 
contemporary capitalist markets, it is not created here. Becker (1975) draws attention to 
the way in which humans are characterised by deep-seated, innate anxieties around the 
fear of  mortality and insignificance. These fears, Becker (1975) suggests, come to 
underpin the project of  causa sui, whereby individuals participate in cultural projects 
which allow them to obtain lasting symbolic existence which extends beyond death. 
Hence, permanence obtained in the symbolic realm is used to assuage anxiety over the 
finitude of  existence in the material realm, allowing individuals to achieve immortality 
through the play of  symbols (Becker 1975). Contemporary capitalism, however, has 
come to pervert the project of  causa sui through its colonisation of  immortality symbols, 
providing late-capitalist subjects with projects which induce rather than console anxiety 
(Tudor forthcoming). The acquisition of  capital offers an opportunity to engage with the 
infinite (Eagleton, 2010), while consumer symbolism is used to create symbolic meaning 
for the individual’s life allowing them to escape the fate of  insignificance (see Hall, 
Winlow & Ancrum 2008; Tudor forthcoming). However, the zero-sum nature of  
economic competition and the ‘in-built obsolescence’ (Hallsworth 2005) of  consumer 
goods mean that feelings of  symbolic security and distinction can only be obtained 
fleetingly before necessitating ongoing engagement. The innate anxieties which 
underpin engagement with the causa sui project are, in the context of  contemporary 
capitalism, intentionally stimulated and harnessed in order to drive economic dynamism 
(Hall, Winlow & Ancrum 2008). The system’s potential to drive economic productivity is 
dependent, therefore, on the preclusion of  the possibility of  long-term satisfaction, 
serving instead to relentlessly stimulate anxiety whilst constantly referring individuals 
back to economic and consumer engagement in the pursuit of  ontological security. 
Owing to the dangerous fusion of  the economic and cultural pressures outlined above, 
sovereign decision making is compelled towards the prioritisation of  the pursuit of  
profit, symbolic distinction and pleasure. As the consequences of  failure in these realms 
include guilt, anxiety, material deprivation and symbolic annihilation, conditions in late-
capitalism combine to create dangerous subjectivities fixated on the achievement of  
material and symbolic survival within a brutally competitive landscape. Moreover, the 
range of  possible behaviours open to the individual seeking to secure an escape from 
anxiety is greatly increased by the systematic processes of  normative deregulation which 
have taken place under liberal capitalism. In his book, On Evil, Morton suggests that: 
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‘[a] person’s act is evil when it results from a strategy or learned procedure which allows 
that person’s deliberations over the choice of  actions not to be inhibited by barriers against 
considering harming or humiliating others that ought to have been in place’ (Morton 
2005, 57; italics in the original). 
The conditions present in late-capitalism, therefore, greatly increase our propensity to 
evil by imbuing us with feelings of  individual sovereignty whilst simultaneously 
subjecting us to intolerable forms of  pressure in the form of  chronic material and 
symbolic insecurity. These pressures nurture our capacity for evil by eroding the barriers 
to harmful acts that ought to be in place within us. As a result, we are left with much less 
protection against the excesses of  competitive capitalist engagement and personal 
enjoyment as individuals feel increasingly pressured to secure their own triumph at any 
cost. The participation in harmful behaviours is not, however, dependent on a 
withdrawal of  support for wider value systems which proscribe such acts, or indeed a 
restructuring of  such value systems (Hall & Antonopoulos 2017), but is instead based in 
a form of  extreme exceptionalism whereby individuals view themselves as being above 
external forms of  regulation. Consideration of  the morality, propriety or legality of  their 
conduct comes to be subjugated to the primacy of  their quest for profit and symbolic 
distinction allowing them to be characterised by what Hall (2012) terms ‘special liberty’.  
The Harms of Toxic Sovereignty  
Exercises in special liberty have thus come to visit a range of  harms upon humanity 
including both those which have, and have not, been subject to legal prohibition. The 
current article seeks to contextualise the accounts of  those involved in systematic 
economic predation in this wider theoretical framework. Interviews carried out with 
those who had been convicted for their involvement in investment fraud indicated that 
their ability to harm others was deeply related to their attempts to exercise special liberty 
in the quest for profit and distinction. Both business and consumption were central to 
the way in which the fraudsters defined themselves (Tudor forthcoming) and both arenas 
represented areas of  life in which they expected to be granted freedom to ‘realise their 
potential’. As a result of  the primacy accorded to their quest for profit, distinction and 
pleasure in their narratives, the respondents found it inconceivable that their efforts 
might be tempered by any considerations which might limit their efficacy in allowing 
them to reach their goals. Consequently, they were unwilling to accept the limitations 
necessitated by compliance with legal and moral frameworks. The importance accorded 
to the consideration that their acts of  economic predation might be both criminal and 
immoral, and might inflict palpable harms on others, was somewhat diminished by their 
fixation on attempting to secure significant personal enrichment, servicing their highly 
crafted identities based on the purchase and display of  consumer goods and the pursuit 
of  pleasure and, ultimately, establishing themselves within the role of  successful 
entrepreneurs (Tudor forthcoming).  
Interviewees did not, therefore, claim ignorance regarding the legality or the 
consequences of  their actions. Rather, they tended to discuss their crimes with a fairly 
resigned candour, regarding them as necessary in order to achieve success in the world 
of  business. They also tended to depict their acts of  criminality as being in keeping with 
wider economic practice and, rather than representing cynical attempts to neutralise 
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their conduct, their observations were often incredibly sapient. They viewed the brutal 
nature of  economic competition and the central role played by both criminal and 
unethical conduct in the mainstream economy and concluded that, to intentionally 
avoid such conduct, would be to put oneself  at a ‘disadvantage in business’. They 
routinely voiced the opinion that in order to make it, one must be willing to ‘operate in 
murky waters’, to ‘push against the boundaries’ or ‘move into the corners of  business 
which become grey and black’. Their decisions to take steps into these behaviours were 
always governed by considerations of  the relative profitability of  criminal enterprise 
when compared with legitimate business and these considerations appeared always to 
eclipse others around the potential consequences of  their actions. 
Discussions of  the harm caused by their crimes tended to be less candid than those 
relating to their legality. Some sought to significantly downplay the harm experienced by 
the victims of  their crimes, whilst others sought to implicate the actions of  the criminal 
justice system in the losses experienced by their investors on account of  their 
intervention in, and subsequent unravelling of, their schemes. Some, such as Alan, 
admitted that it was ‘unfortunate that people lost money’ but sought to balance these 
losses against the consideration that the schemes ‘made a lot of  people very rich.’ 
Others, including Mark, sought to construct their victims’ willingness to invest in their 
schemes as being symptomatic of  their greed or inherent dishonesty. During one 
interview, Mark went further suggesting that investors were ‘too weak’ to break the law 
themselves and so they are forced into becoming ‘prey’ rather than having the ‘strength’ 
to become involved in acts of  criminality. He said:  
‘It is also a truism that you cannot cheat an honest man, because they just 
don’t fall for it. They just don’t. They either have to be greedy, or in 
desperate need of  something. Or, they’d know that out there there’s lots of  
money, if  they’d just come off  the rules for a bit. But their view is that 
they’re steaming angry that the people who are wealthy got there before 
them, because they broke the rules. So they’ve got to find their own way to 
break the rules without them having to worry. They know it isn’t legitimate, 
but they don’t care. They are too weak to go for it for themselves, so they 
have to come to an outfit like us.’ Mark 
  
The accounts of  harm and criminality offered by the respondents were deeply 
entrenched in survivalist logic in which their actions were framed as a means of  
surviving or of  remaining competitive. The respondents displayed a deep enchantment 
with neoliberal notions of  sovereignty and self-sufficiency and they sought to portray 
themselves as hard-working individuals who had struggled against adversity to achieve 
great things. They were self-made men whose achievements in enterprise were testament 
to their special talents and sagacious decision-making. Their accounts sought to 
construct themselves as heroes, whose significant business capabilities were employed in 
order to benefit and enrich both themselves and others, thereby portraying themselves as 
Western incarnations of  the anthropological ‘Big Man’ (Gilmore 1990). Indeed, they 
regularly cited their ability to generate large sums of  financial wealth as the basis for 
their belief  that the world should turn a blind eye to their conduct. They suggested that, 
should they be afforded the freedom to conduct their business, then all would benefit 
even if  this involved them ‘coming off  the rules for a bit.’ The positions of  freedom they 
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carved out, therefore, were deeply excessive and were justified by the invocation of  
consequentialist logic relating to the production of  profit. Ultimately, their criminality 
was explained by the levels of  productivity it afforded. They regularly made assertions 
of  sovereignty and appeared to view their ability to engage in business activity, and to 
produce profit, as an inalienable right. Whilst they disliked the idea and the experience 
of  imprisonment, it was generally accepted as part of  the risk associated with 
involvement in criminality. The subject of  disqualification, and in some cases 
confiscation, provoked much stronger reactions among the men who viewed such 
practices as ‘insufferable’ and ‘unjustifiable’. When discussing his disqualification from 
directorship, Richard found the idea of  his compliance with these requirements 
‘inconceivable’: 
‘I’ve been inside. I served my time. I paid the money. Then the bastards try 
and stick a ten year ban on me… they can’t do that. Who do they think they 
are? ... There are ways round these things, obviously... and that’s what I’ll 
have to do. I mean, they can’t expect you not to work. I’m in my prime. 
This is what I do. How can they legitimately interfere in your business once 
you have done your time? Of  course they can’t. It’s ridiculous.’ Richard  
Similarly, as part of  his sentence Monty had been banned from participation in business 
activities which involved taking deposits from individual investors. Over the course of  
our conversations it transpired that Monty was currently involved in money renting 
schemes which involved individual investors. When the question of  the legality of  this 
enterprise arose, he replied:  
‘Who are they to tell me who I can and can’t do business with? Who are they 
to determine the nature of  my affairs? They have absolutely no right to speak 
on these matters.’ Monty 
Frank had been subject to a fifteen-year ban on company directorship and because he 
perceived this to infringe upon his right to make money, it was a source of  extreme 
frustration to him. The revocation of  his entrepreneurial freedoms was something which 
would impact negatively on the world as he would be prevented from employing his 
talents in the world of  business: 
‘At my age…well, at my age it is essentially a life ban from directorship. A 
life ban from what I do, from what I’m good at. I mean, doesn’t it seem 
ridiculous that they want £1m from me and yet they ban me from 
directorship? I could make the money in no time if  it wasn’t for that. It 
doesn’t make sense… All the time in prison, they talk about reform, giving 
back, changing and doing good. But with this, they are preventing me from 
doing all of  that…I’m a talented businessman and they try to stop me from 
doing good, from making money. It’s absurd.’ Frank 
Thus, discussions around the legal and moral legitimacy of  the respondents’ conduct 
came to demonstrate the centrality of  the notion of  sovereignty to their understandings 
of  their economic practice. Their vehement rejection of  the restrictions imposed upon 
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them by the criminal justice system demonstrated their unwillingness to allow external 
influences to detract from their economic goals. Instead, respondents sought to carve out 
individualised spaces of  freedom in which they could exercise an excessive form of  
liberty which allowed them to act untrammelled by the restrictions of  legal and ethical 
frameworks in order that they could compete effectively in the struggle for enrichment. 
However, whilst respondents sought to portray their unrestrained ‘business practices’ as 
an expression of  their personal sovereignty, the reality of  their situations suggested 
otherwise. Rather, their accounts indicated that their involvement in criminal economic 
practice continued even when it came to have significantly damaging consequences for 
them and their families including relationship breakdown, arrest and victim reprisals. 
Pete, for example, continued to take deposits from members of  his local community 
despite investors targeting him and his family when they became suspicious about the 
legitimacy of  his investment scheme: 
‘Well, I mean it wasn’t like people round here didn’t ask no questions [sic]. 
‘Course they did, man! It took time for those things to happen ‘cause 
everyone was so excited about the money that was flying around at the time, 
but when people started to ask questions... that was when things got bad... I 
mean they torched my car; they torched my sister’s car. That was their way 
of  saying ‘we’re watching how this is going to pan out.’ [Name of  co-
defendant], well he got it bad. They actually kidnapped him and warned 
him that if  things went bad, then, well, they wouldn’t forget.’  Pete 
‘Is that when you gave up on the scheme then?’ Interviewer 
‘No. No, that came much later. No, at that point... that was when things 
were really starting to take off  for us.’ Pete 
During their careers which spanned the boundary of  legality, all but two of  the 
respondents had attained fairly significant levels of  personal wealth and economic 
security. However, none had chosen to cease their criminal enterprises at this point, 
reporting instead that they continued to be plagued by feelings of  economic insecurity, 
desire and dissatisfaction (Tudor forthcoming). Instead, they all sought to continue their 
illicit acquisition towards the point of  self-destruction, evidencing the way in which 
human subjectivity has become divorced and alienated from the experience of  
satisfaction (McGowan 2016). The compulsive drive towards endless economic 
expansion thus not only imbued them with an ability to harm others, but also enabled 
them to pursue actions which significantly undermined their own interests. Therefore, 
whilst their accounts of  their renunciation of  external regulation evidenced the 
centrality of  the notion of  sovereignty to their subjective experience, their acts of  
criminality could be more accurately understood to be sustained by the fantasy of  
sovereignty which served to obfuscate the reality of  their complete subjugation to the 
requirements of  capital in their attempts to escape anxiety.  
The Terrifying Spectre of Insignificance 
The renunciation of  limitation was also a subject that respondents sought to repeatedly 
return to when discussing their engagement with consumption. The respondents’ 
identities were deeply dependent on interaction with consumer goods and their 
attendant symbolism, and the pursuit, purchase and display of  these goods represented 
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a central preoccupation of  their existence (Tudor forthcoming). Using key consumer 
goods and experiences, the respondents crafted narcissistic fantasy identities which were, 
they believed, reflective of  their true selves and consequently, their pursuit of  these items 
was characterised by an extreme intensity. During conversations, this intensity appeared 
in the form of  a deep enchantment with consumer goods and experiences; expressions 
of  entitlement in relation to these goods; and the descriptions of  the way in which their 
consumption escalated significantly over time. Their ability to engage in the pursuit of  
pleasure was one of  the key ways in which they attempted to symbolise their success and 
to demonstrate their ability to exercise sovereignty. During interviews, they constantly 
sought to impress upon me the ways in which they were able to pursue the indulgence 
of  their interests. 
All of  the men were very open about the way in which their criminality served as a 
vehicle to access the things that they desired, both allowing them to obtain goods which 
would otherwise be out of  reach, and as a means of  expediting access. They also 
described how they sought out increasingly luxurious, exclusive or rare artefacts and 
experiences over time as the revenues from their criminality increased (Tudor 
forthcoming). However, this escalation in consumption did not only result from the 
pragmatic liberation afforded by the availability of  greater resources, but also related to 
a form of  symbolic liberation whereby they came to be driven by a deep sense of  
entitlement. They were not, therefore, consuming more because they could afford to do 
so, rather they actively sought to increase their criminal endeavours in order to facilitate 
increasing levels of  consumption. The idea of  sovereignty in the realm of  consumption 
was deeply excessive in the sense that it surpassed the notion of  the individual who is 
empowered to make choices which are informed by their personal tastes and interests, 
crossing over instead into the realm of  the individual who is plagued by visions of  excess 
and indulgence and who is willing to cause harm to others in order to achieve them. 
The way in which their identities had become fused with these goods and lifestyles 
meant that they considered engagement with consumption, as with business, as an 
inalienable right. The sense of  entitlement that they felt was not simply a superficial, 
self-indulgent expectation of  privilege, but was underpinned by a much deeper sense of  
anxiety owing to the fact that they felt their access to these goods was essential to their 
existence; their symbolic survival was dependent upon it (Becker 1975; Hallsworth 2005; 
Hall, Winlow & Ancrum 2008; see also Tudor forthcoming). As a result, the prospect of  
being without these forms of  symbolic adornment invoked a primal anxiety around the 
fear of  insignificance, providing the impetus for the acts of  criminality which ensured 
the continued presence of  these goods in their lives (Becker 1975). Rather than the 
assertion of  sovereignty, therefore, the respondents’ pursuit of  pleasure and distinction 
was one that was based on compulsion, demonstrating the way in which ‘imaginary 
identities’ serve as ‘key loci of  operations of  control’ (Dean 2009, 67) in contemporary 
capitalism. Crucially, this compulsion was underpinned by their failure to experience 
satisfaction in their consumption and display of  commodities and was representative of  
the way in which ‘the failure to accumulate enough is inscribed in the 
system’ (McGowan 2016, 21). 
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Conclusion 
As a result of  the recent revival of  philosophical liberalism, the notion of  sovereignty 
has played a central role in the transformation of  the West under late-capitalism. Both 
the establishment of  neoliberal economics and consumer culture have been heavily 
underpinned by the notion of  the self-determining, sovereign individual. Within this 
context, sovereignty has come to be elevated not just as a right, but also a responsibility, 
with self-governing individuals being called upon not only to determine their own life 
course, but also to be responsible for their own economic survival and for the 
maximisation of  their own enjoyment in capitalist markets. Consequently, the notion of  
sovereignty has come to operate as a deeply seductive ideal which facilitates and 
mobilises participation in stark forms of  extreme self  sufficiency. As a result of  their 
existence in cultures of  extreme individualism which are characterised by the decline of  
symbolic efficiency, citizens of  late-capitalism are subject to processes of  extreme 
deregulation meaning that the type of  sovereignty accorded to them comes to take on an 
excessive characteristic. The nature of  this sovereignty ultimately leads towards ethical 
solipsism. From the liberal perspective, the individual operating in this deregulated space 
of  negative liberty is free to choose his or her own actions, which ought only to be 
limited by consideration of  the rights of  others. However, the pressure exerted on the 
individual by late-capitalism means that he or she is forced to operate under the constant 
threat of  both material and symbolic annihilation. The intensity of  the pursuit of  profit 
and distinction which results from this pervasive culture of  insecurity means that the 
individual strives for the assertion of  a purer form of  sovereignty which renounces the 
legitimacy of  any form of  external regulation whatsoever. In the declaration of  ‘special 
liberty’ (Hall 2012), the individual is therefore liberated from the requirements of  ethical 
and legal frameworks meaning that the decisions they make in the pursuit of  profit and 
distinction need no longer be constrained by barriers which prevent the slide into 
harmful behaviours. Thus, whilst the move into special liberty represents an assertion of  
pure sovereignty insofar as it signifies the extreme dislocation of  the individual from 
regulatory frameworks, it cannot be considered a true expression of  self-determination 
on account of  the individual’s complete surrender to the systemic demands limitless 
accumulation.   
The notion of  sovereignty was found to play a central role in the subjective experiences 
of  fraudsters. The acts of  economic predation for which they were responsible were an 
expression of  this excessive form of  sovereignty, symbolised by the renunciation of  
limitation of  their business pursuits. Their criminality was also motivated by the ideal of  
sovereignty as they sought to attain positions in which they could consume without 
limitation, assuring their access to the goods needed to maintain the fantasy of  their 
idealised identities. This preoccupation with sovereignty and self-determination, 
however, ultimately operated as fantasy, allowing them to escape from the reality of  the 
anxieties which underpinned their quest for enrichment and distinction. The feelings of  
sovereignty attained through their complete immersion in the project of  accumulation 
and display allowed them to transcend feelings of  limitation and insecurity, albeit only 
temporarily. Even when participation in this perverted, late-capitalist incarnation of  the 
casua sui project (Tudor forthcoming) became disadvantageous, fraudsters remained 
committed to the struggle for enrichment. Thus, the sovereignty that was both 
expressed, and obtained, through their criminality was, in the end, an illusion which 
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served to allay anxieties over the ultimate helplessness of  mortal beings. Their drive to 
carve out spaces of  extreme liberation within which they were willing to inflict harm 
upon others in their pursuit of  profit was ultimately reflective of  their complete 
enslavement to the requirements of  capital, rather than of  their freedom to self-govern.   
Analysis of  the conditions present within contemporary capitalism therefore, is crucial to 
understanding the way in which harmful subjectivities and behaviours are cultivated. 
The deeply individualizing and deregulatory forces which stand at the heart of  the 
project of  liberalism open up the possibility of  harm through the extirpation of  
universal and collectivist principles upon which politics and ethics are dependent. As a 
result, late-capitalist subjects come to be characterised by an ‘incapacity... to name and 
strive for good’ (Badiou 2001, 30). The development of  more positive environments 
which may reduce the incidence of  harm and predation is dependent, therefore, on the 
move towards new modes of  political thinking which ‘reject finitude’ (Badiou 2006, 142) 
and which are ‘engaged in rendering explicit the subjective infinity of  situations’ (Badiou 
2006, 143). Changes in this direction would enable us to abandon liberalism’s minimalist 
framework of  negative liberty, moving instead towards the construction of  political 
projects which pursue notions of  positive liberty and shared notions of  the Good which 
in turn might offer a platform from which to question the legitimacy of  current 
economic arrangements and the harms that they generate.  
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